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National Struggles in a
Transnational Economy:
A Critical Analysis of US Labor's
Campaign Against NAFTA
Jefferson Cowie
A
Following an overview of US workers' changing relation to free
trade in the postwar era, this article offers a critical review of labor's fight
against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Breaking
the campaign down into a typology of four major themes around which
the struggle focused— f^ear of job losses, the unfair suppression of labor
rights in Mexico, cross-border solidarity, and intemational labor rights—
it explores the efficacy of these approaches in terms of their ability to
build toward a transnational agenda for unions in North America. The
article argues that, although many new and creative ideas emerged from
the struggle, the overall tone and content of the anti-NAFTA campaign
failed to construct a usable transnational political space for the future of
organized labor and instead served to nurture nationalistic social identi-
ties within the United States. ^ /"f f 2.-
The bruising battle over the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) presented the most prominent public discussion to date about US
workers and the growing trends toward a continental labor market and a
globally integrated economy. ^ It is of crucial importance, however, not to
The author recently completed his doctorate in labor history at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and is a former Research Fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies at the University of California, San Diego.
1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference "Labor, Free Trade
and Economic Integration in the Americas" at Duke University, 25-27 August 1994, and a
later version at the Twenty-First Annual Southwest Labor Studies Conference at the University
of California at Los Angeles, 4-6 May 1995. It draws on the energetic collaborations of the
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mistake the trade agreement for the broader trend of North American or
global economic change itself. The continental pact stirred up only the loud-
est and most contested aspect of a much lafger process of silent economic
integration that has been taking place over the last two decades, and one that
would have undoubtedly continued with or without the successful passage of
the trade deal. Yet how successfully organized labor, its progressive allies,
and its international bodies respond to the challenges of all aspects of
globalization, including regional trade blocs, will have a decisive impact on
labor rights and standards, wages, working conditions, health and safety
issues, and the level of material and moral dignity working people can ex-
pect to achieve in a pattern of production that threatens to pit worker against
worker on a global scale. For these reasons it is worth turning a critical eye
toward how organized labor in the United States presents its political iden-
tity in the global arena.
Labor advocates, progressives, and a variety of non-governmental or-
ganizations have responded to the erosion of employment and labor rights
and standards by putting forth numerous counterproposals, social clauses,
and labor rights mechanisms that would either modify or transform these
trade pacts in order to protect workers' rights in the globalizing economy.^
Although many engaging and creative strategies emerged during and after
the anti-NAFTA struggle, it is the argument of this paper that the main-
stream of organized labor in the United States created only the most incipi-
ent and fragile of political spaces for progressive alternatives to the tfade
deal. The tone and content of the campaign did not work to build strong and
useful forms of transnational politics in North America, and, equally as
troubling, the nation-based social identities which continued to be marshaled
by organized labor did not address the fundamental issues presented by the
ongoing dilemma of global economic integration. The NAFTA fight did,
however, provide the opportunity to begin the long process of reassessing
the strategic vision of labor unions since the end of the postwar booft.
Duke-UNC Working Group on Labor and Free Trade. Special thanks go to working group
members John D. French, Scott Littlehale, and Mark Healey, and the many members of the
labor movement who kindly took time out to assist me with documents and information.
Gratitude to Ian Robinson and Victor Munoz for insightful and lengthy debates over these
ideas, and thanks to Leon Fink, Georg Leidenberger, and David Barkin.
2. For a brief outline of NAFTA's deficiencies see Darryl Hotter, "What NAFTA Needs:
Labor Standards and Worker Rights," Latin American Labor News 6&7(1992-1993).
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I. History
Workers in the United States have enjoyed an enviable position in the
world economy throughout the ppstwar era, and remained the major recipi-
ents of the bounty created by trade liberalization in the postwar era. In
contrast to today's struggle over NAFTA, for instance, the AFL-CIO played
a key role in the fight to pass President Kennedy's tariff-reducing Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. Designed to increase trade by lowering tariffs up to
50 percent over five or more years, labor understood the bill to be in fun-
damental harmony with its needs. For workers during the "Golden Age" of
US capitalism—a period of uneasy but mutual recognition between labor
and capital—the equation was relatively simple: expanding trade meant a
growing economy which meant both rising wages and increased job oppor-
tunities in the United States.^
The year 1962 also saw another component in the AFL-CIO's global
plan: the opening of the American Institute for Free Labor Development
(AIFLD) designed to proselytize its vision of mutual collaboration between
labor, govemment, and business. The organization quickly became an arm
of the US government's foreign policy establishment by spreading business-
style unionism throughout Latin America in an effort to oppose a variety of
insurgent Marxist-led labor-movements. The result, however, was the subor-
dination of democracy abroad to the creation of stable climates for US
foreign investment. Much like the goal of lowering tariffs to increase trade,
the AIFLD sought to promote the economic interests of US workers by
securing raw materials and expanding markets—often at the expense of
Latin American workers' democratic struggles.^
Less than ten years after the AFL-CIO heartily endorsed free trade and
created the AIFLD, changes in US workers' position in the emerging pattern
of transnational production and world competition forced organized labor to
tum from advocating open intemational markets to a failed attempt to slam
the door on the encroaching global economy. As competition sharpened
from Japan and Europe, US-based corporations began outsourcing produc-
tion to offshore sites which meant that unionists began to associate intema-
3. Peter Donahue, '"Free Trade' Unions and the State: Trade Liberalization's Endorse-
ment by the AFL-CIO, 1943-1962," Research in Political Economy 13(1992): 54-64; for a
useful discussion a labor-capital settlement in the postwar era see Bruce Nissen, "A Post-
World War II 'Social Accord?'" in Bruce Nissen, ed., US Labor Relations, 1945-1989: Ac-
commodation and Conflict (New York: Garland, 1990), 173-207.
4. Paul G. Buchanan, "The Impact of US Labor," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed.. Export-
ing Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1991), 158.
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tional trade not with unprecedented prosperity but with an exodus of US jobs
and the erosion of domestic working standards and labor rights. Similarly,
pacified foreign labor movements slowly began to appear less like victories
in the Cold War than they did the key criteria in corporations' plant location
decisions. For US workers, the world began to appear less like a resource-
rich backyard than it did a hostile neighborhood filled with, as Willie Farah
reminded his employees during the great 1974 garment workers' strike, "2
billion foreigners out there willing to work for 10 cents an hour."^
In response to these transformations, the unions rallied behind (and
helped to write) the highly protectionist Hartke-Burke Foreign Trade and
Investment Proposal of 1973 which included taxing foreign eamings of US
corporations, eliminating tariff loopholes that supported the emerging ex-
port-processing zones, and fixing the share of the market taken by imports
at levels reached in the late 1960s (the last period of uncontested US eco-
nomic dominance). Senate sponsor Vance Hartke's argument for the bill
captured labor's new position: "we can no longer afford to export American
jobs and technology at the expense of our own industry, all in the name of
'free trade."'^ As one journalist poignantly noted in the wake of labor's new-
found protectionism, back when George Meany endorsed the 1962 free trade
proposal he confidently proclaimed that we need "to open up our markets to
such products as British woolens, German cars and Japanese toys," but he
said "not a word about Japanese automobiles, television sets or steel" which
now threatened US labor's privileged position in the world.^  In retrospect,
both labor's active political support for US hegemony over Latin America
and its traditional advocacy of free trade were guided by "the logic of
material and organizational self-preservation" forged in an era of Cold War
and unprecedented prosperity.*
Yet the political paradigms labor built for itself during the collapse of
the postwar boom have become of limited value in an increasingly complex
and competitive economic world. When the economic tables began to tum
in the 1970s, the AFL-CIO's first strategy was a simple defensive struggle
to protect what it had. Advocating "Buy American" campaigns, maintaining
official support for the Vietnam War, tuming toward plans like Hartke-
Burke, and losing its comfortable niche in the Democratic Party, the AFL-
5. NACLA, Latin America Report, "Hit and Run: US Runaway Shops on the Mexican
Border" 9 (July-August 1975): 27.
6. Congress, Senate, Senator Hartke, 92d Cong. 1st sess.. Congressional Record (28
September 1971), vol. 117, pt. 25, 5136.
7. Irwin Ross, "Labor's Big Push for Protectionism," Fortune 87(March 1973): 94.
8. Buchanan, "The Impact of US Labor," 183.
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CIO ended up devolving "bit by bit" into what one critic called "a great
snapping turtle, plodding along when it moves at all."^ Despite this defen-
sive posture, the divergence of economic interests between labor and busi-
ness in the early 1970s also meant a slow ideological drift for unions away
from a parochial attendance to corporate needs for an expanding economy.
In its place emerged an ambivalent, but growing, interest in third-world
workers with whom they began to compete and a shrill criticism of unre-
strained capital—most of which evolved into some form of industrial protec-
tionism. As Steven Hecker has suggested, however, it is not difficult to
understand labor's position. "The massive loss of high-wage industrial jobs,
capital flight and anti-union actions of US corporations and their allies in
govemment," he suggests, "all taking place under an ideological regime that
rejects industrial policy and a high-wage strategy as a means of competing
in a global economy, cause many unions to see few other immediate alter-
natives to protection." I*'
By giving a political face to many of the otherwise elusive problems
of global restructuring, deindustrialization, and downward harmonization,
NAFTA ignited rank-and-file anger and thrust organized labor into an en-
gaged center-stage role in the national discussion over the future of the
political economy. The arrival of the trade pact therefore arrested a decade
of political drift and retrenchment for unions in the United States. Caught
between the global future and the weight of recent history, however, labor
and its allies failed to offer more than a glimpse of what a long range
alternative path might be for North American workers. Two obstacles
blocked the path: the first was understanding the historical legacy of orga-
nized labor's role in constructing, promoting, and profiting from the unique
and highly uneven prosperity of the postwar era. The second was overcom-
ing the general lack of creative solutions to the burden and privilege of
working in the richest country in the world in an emerging pattern of global
production—yet in a nation which has abdicated all responsibility for indus-
trial policy to the free market.
That unions showed an "unwillingness to counter the free market
position with a more viable, positive-sum policy" remains a true but simpli-
fied understanding of US labor's tortuous path toward a transnational discus-
9. David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), 170-171; this metaphor is used to describe labor's political ideologies rather than
its relationship to foreign trade but is applicable here.
10. Steven Hecker, "US Unions, Trade and International Solidarity: Emerging Issues and
Tactics" Economic and Industrial Democracy 14(1993): 357.
8 LABOR STUDIES JOURNALAVINTER1997
sion and a globally responsible vision. ^ ^ In order to explore the efficacy of
certain approaches to free trade, this paper now turns to examining how
certain arguments against the pact resonated with workers at home and what
messages they sent abroad. The emphasis here is not on the events them-
selves but on the effectiveness of, and contradictions in, the various themes
and ideas presented in the NAFTA fight. By analyzing the tactics and im-
ages embedded in popular union-press stories, flyers, leaflets, campaign
advertisements, and legislative testimony, we can explore how the politics of
trade integration created overly simplistic images and often mobilized coun-
terproductive identities around the touchstone issue of NAFTA. As the po-
litical rise of billionaire Ross Perot and other right-wing populists made
evident, there was adequate political energy to sustain a social movement
against unregulated globalization. The question remains, however, as to how
that energy and anger could have been—and might yet be— b^est molded into
an alternative to global neoliberalism.
Rather than moving chronologically though the NAFTA fight, the
campaign has been separated into a four-part typology of arguments or,
more accurately, four modes of discourse.'^ The most prominent tactic used
against the agreement, around which all other arguments were arranged, was
the idea that "NAFTA will cause jobs to move to Mexico." Another impor-
tant approach, and one that followed the rhythm provided by the first, was
a paternalism that bordered on demonization of Mexican workers based on
the premise that labor rights in Mexico were not adequately enforced or
rigorous enough for a free trade pact with the United States. These two
nation-based arguments pushed against two weaker currents in the anti-
NAFTA mobilization which struggled toward a more transnational solution.
First was international solidarity efforts that showcased innovative worker-
to-worker meetings across borders and, on occasion, struggles for cross-
border organizing. The fourth, and least prominent of the four arguments,
was the promotion of an international body of labor rights and standards.
11. Stephen Fielding Diamond, "US Labor and North American Economic Integration,"
in Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron, eds.. The Political Economy of North Ameri-
can Free Trade (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 253.
12. It is impossible to define exactly "who speaks for labor" in this research, but the
materials studied here are primarily products of the mainstream of the US labor movement and
its federation the AFL-CIO. Labor's various allies— i^ntellectuals, coalition members, other
NGOs—and important dissident unions have not been given as much attention as the approach
here was to ansiyze the message being received by the majority of the rank and file. "Modes
of discourse" is used because what is often put forth is not so much argumentation as it is the
perpetuation of an ideology or a structure of labor's identity which may contain within it
numerous specific arguments.
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Considered as an aggregate response, these four approaches to the pact
complicate the obvious fact that "labor opposed NAFTA" by revealing a
complex multiplicity of discourses that were in uneasy balance with each
other in the struggle against the trade deal. Each is analyzed in detail below.
n. The NAFTA Math of Job Losses
Although long-range solutions to the dilemmas of work in the chang-
ing world order will require some form of transnational solution, one of the
fundamental obstacles to conceiving such a strategy, as Roger Southall has
pointed out, is that workers in the advanced capitalist countries will "become
increasingly obsessed by the loss of jobs imposed by the relocation of capital
from core to third world sites." Occasional defensive struggles against capi-
tal migration such as govemmental protection or wage and benefit conces-
sions may offer some temporary relief in the short run, he argues, but "they
are unlikely to halt the drift of jobs away from the centre to the periphery;
this after all, is the very essence of the CIDL [changing intemational divi-
sion of labor] ."13 As if to confirm Southall's concems, the New York Times
proclaimed job losses to Mexico to be "the most potent political obstacle to
Congressional approval" of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the mobilization of political action around the very real fear of job losses
posed the central, and most problematic, dimension to labor's response to
NAFTA.14
The job-loss discussion operated on two interconnected levels. The
first was academic and legislative analyses which tried to predict the num-
bers of jobs that would be lost or gained under the agreement. Ironically,
given the amount of energy and political wind expended on these calcula-
tions, the numbers never added up to a significant percentage of the jobs in
the entire economy. The second, which permeated all aspects of the NAFTA
discussion, was a more generalized, but equally powerful, image of the
runaway shop which threatened to destroy the social fabric of US commu-
nities. The fact that jobs would be eliminated under the trade pact was
beyond questioii, and the fact that placing the "lost jobs" tactic at the center
of the campaign would release immense emotional and political energy was
equally beyond question. While this strategy tapped into the basic anger and
instincts of US workers, however, it diverted the discussion away from a
13. Roger Southall, "At Issue," in Southall, ed, Trade Unions and the New Industrial-
ization of the Third World (Pittsburgh: University of Kttsburgh Press, 1988), 19.
14. New York Times, 17 February 1993.
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more useful political agenda for the ongoing future of trade integration.
In proposing the extension of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement to
Mexico, the Bush administration predicted the creation of 175,000 jobs.'^
The most commonly cited figure for both the Bush and Clinton administra-
tions, however, settled on a much trumpeted 200,000 jobs to be gained over
many years following the agreement. Some, such as Special Trade Repre-
sentative Mickey Kantor, went so far as to tum the job loss argument on its
head by claiming that the defeat of NAFTA would mean job losses of
400,000 because of falling exports to Mexico. The Clinton administration's
"NAFTA math" as US Senator Carl Levin derisively called it, never added
up, however, and came under sustained attack from both scholars and mem-
bers of Congress. The credibility of pro-NAFTA economists' predictions
was further weakened by the revelation that of one-hundred and fifty econo-
mists who went on record as supporting NAFTA, only nineteen could claim
any familiarity with the contents of the agreement.'^
The AFL-CIO Task Force on Trade countered the pro-NAFTA calcu-
lations with numerous studies that produced more traumatic numbers. Most
frequently cited in the labor-oriented literature were the union-supported
Economic Policy Institute figures that predicted losses of 550,000 jobs and
a reduction of US GDP of $36 billion in the ten years following the agree-
ment, and a University of Massachusetts at Amherst study that showed
490,000 jobs to be eliminated in the US by the year 2000. Another fre-
quently cited approach came from Pat Choate (later to align with Perot) and
the Manufacturing Policy Project which identified all US manufacturers in
the low to mid technology range which have a labor content equivalent to
20 to 30 percent of sales. The conclusion of this study was that all 5.9
million of these jobs should be considered "vulnerable" to relocation to
Mexico."
15. George Bush, North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada;
Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting Notification of his intent
to enter into a North American Free Trade Agreement with the govemments of Mexico and
Canada, purstumt to section 1103(a)(l) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (Washington: GPO, 1992).
16. "Prepared Statement of Senator Dorgan," NAFTA Job Claims: Truth in Statistics,
p.6; See also, James M. Cypher, 'The Ideology of Economic Science in the Selling of NAFTA:
The Political Economy of Elite Decision Making," paf)er presented to the International Con-
ference on the North American Free Trade Agreement, Centro de Estudios Economia Teoda
y Practica, Mexico, D.F., 17-19 March 1993; and William E. Spriggs and James Stanford,
"Economists' Assessments of the Likely Employment and Wage Effects of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement," Hofstra Labor Law Journal 10(Spring 1993): 495-536.
17. See AFL-CIO Task Force on Trade, "North American Free Trade Negotiations, The
Jobs Debate: Fiction & Reality" (#21) (Washington: AFL-CIO, 1992), "North American Free
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While traumatic and horribly real to the individuals who would lose
their jobs, the number of employment opportunities lost or gained in either
the pro or anti-NAFTA positions represented very little in terms of annual
employment fluctuations. When anti-NAFTA economist James Stanford
attempted to rectify the most egregious errors of the economic models on
both sides of the NAFTA fight by building more "realistic" assumptions into
his model, he found that the maximum dislocation of US workers as a direct
consequence of the agreement would only be 0.43 percent of the work force.
Stanford's model building leads one to conclusions similar to Republican
Senator Steve Symms, who claimed that the jobs argument was basically
peripheral to the NAFTA debate. "Most of the neutral studies," he argued,
"put the loss of jobs around 175,000, and the gain of jobs from this at around
325,000. But when you compare that with an 86 million work force in place
today, it just does not seem like that argument is substantial."'* Clearly it
was not absolute numbers that the anti-NAFTA forces were concerned with,
but instead, the placing of economic uncertainty and fear over the future of
the economy at the center of the debate.
Thus the second part of the jobs loss discourse highlighted the more
abstract imagery of the runaway shop and generalized notions of job losses.
The United Food and Commercial Workers' flyer claimed "A US-Mexico
Free Trade Agreement will encourage food processing companies to move
south of the border." The United Auto Workers opposed NAFTA "because
Trade Agreement, The Jobs Debate: Part ir ' (#22) (Washington: AFL-CIO, 1993). Cited are
Geoffrey Faux and William Spriggs. "U.S. Jobs and the Mexico Trade Proposal" (Washington:
Economic Policy Institute, 1991); Timothy Koechlin, Mehrene Larudee, Samuel Bowles, and
Gerald Epstein, "Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Investment, Employ-
ment and Wages in Mexico and the U.S." (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1992); see
also Pat Choate, "Jobs at Risk: Vulnerable US Industries and Jobs Under NAFTA" (Amherst:
The Manufacturing Policy Project, April 1993). Although the Bush administration provided its
own figures, probably the most frequently cited pro-NAFTA job figures came from two
studies by Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade: Issues and
Recommendations (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992) and NAFTA: An
Assessment (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1993). When Hufbauer and
Schott lowered their estimates of job creation by tens of thousands of jobs in the interim
between their two studies, the AFL-CIO seized the opportunity to show the lack of objectivity
and careful research going into the pro-NAFTA argument. Similarly, when the International
Trade Commission released figures from research originally designed to calm fears around
NAFTA, it was a big boon to the jobs loss debate. The February 1993 ITC report concluded
that the agreement would create only 35,000 to 93,500 US jobs by 1995 which would barely
mask the loss of positions under the agreement.
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, Hearings before the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, "On Labor Issues, Business and Labor
Views, and Agriculture and Energy Issues Concerning NAFTA," September 8, 10, 22, and 30,
1992 (Washington; GPO, 1993), 115.
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it does nothing to stop US companies from closing plants in this county and
moving production to Mexico." The Intemational Union of Electrical Work-
ers' banner proclaimed "IUE says STOP Bush's Mexico Trade Deal: Save
US Jobs." The AFL-CIO, argued against the "job-gutting Mexican trade
pact" which would "drain many thousands more US jobs across the border
and exploit the poverty wages of Mexican workers."'^ Unions brought these
abstractions down to a concrete level in their literature as the Intemational
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and the Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), for instance, published all of the
names of their factories that had moved to Mexico and the numbers of
members displaced by the runaway plants. Similarly, the AFL-CIO included
a lengthy listing of jobs lost to Mexico with a map of the US superimposed
over the litany of job losses and capital flight.^ **
The difficulties involved in delineating allies from enemies in the job-
loss approach to globalization can be found in the example of the Teamsters,
whose organization regained an exciting hold on the labor movement
through the success of the insurgent Teamsters for a Democratic Union
(TDU) and their new President Ron Carey. Taking to the road with projects
such as the truck caravan dubbed the "Economic Earthquake Express" (in-
cluding a stage constructed on a forty-eight foot flatbed trailer and video
viewing area constructed on another truck), the mobile campaign delivered
the anti-NAFTA message across the country. Holding rallies, and visiting
factories, shopping malls, and city halls to wam people about the perils of
NAFTA, the Teamsters built a strong movement-style opposition to the free
trade initiative.
An ambivalent example of labor's anti-NAFTA discourse is a Team-
ster leaflet headlined, "This worker for a US company in Mexico makes $4
per day .. . Big US Corporations are threatening America's working people.
'Either take big cuts in pay and benefits,' they say, 'or we'll move your job
to Mexico." The leaflet is not directly about NAFTA, but actually part of a
campaign to elect Bill Clinton. Pictured on the other side of a wire fence is
a young, able-bodied, Mexican worker staring across at the reader. The
19. Statement of Segundo Mercado-Llorens of UFCW, North American Free Trade
Agreement: American Jobs and Environmental Protection, Hearing Before the Subcommittees
on Intemational Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives 102d Cong. 1st sess., (December 9, 1991);
"UAW Legislative Fact Sheet on NAFTA" mimeo, n.d.; AFL-CIO News, 8 December 1992;
AFI^CIO News, 9 September 1992.
20. AFL-CIO News, 29 April 1991; IBEW, "Examples of IBEW Job Loss to Mexico"
mimeo, n.d.
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subtext of the red, white and blue leaflet seems to imply that this is the man
who may take your job if NAFTA is successfully implemented. In an ironic
twist of political stratagem then, the Mexican worker appears as the US
worker's enemy, while (pro-NAFTA) Bill Clinton is presumably the US
worker's ally.^'
The Teamsters' example suggests how, rather than generating under-
standing and shared political space between the workers of different coun-
tries, the emphasis on job losses tended to make Mexicans the eneniy of the
US worker. This approach exacts a future price in terms of relations with
Mexican (and other nations') workers by pitting wage earner against wage
earner. Mexicans want the same jobs US unions are trying to defend, so the
line of argument contains both an implicit demand for protection and a
denial of jobs to Mexican workers in what appears to be a zero-sum game
of global employment. The "jobs argument" simply did not function in a
way that transcends borders (as capital has already done) and actually rein-
forced the cultural and economic usefulness of political boundaries for
transnational corporations by deepening the political and economic divisions
in the labor market. Domestically, this tactic might further serve to immo-
bilize any worker who feared for the future of her or his job as quiescence
became the price of maintaining an employment commitment to a given
community. Moreover, mobilization around job protection never addressed
the fundamental issue, a worker's proprietary right to a job, while it diverted
attention away from the more important issues that could offer connections
to workers of all nations: the types and quality of jobs, working conditions,
and community life to be had under a regime that sought economic integra-
tion but social segmentation.
The "jobs body count" approach also reinforced the notion that trade
with Mexico was a yes or no choice, rather than fostering a more productive
discussion over the terms and structures under which a socially responsible
trade regime might be implemented. Under the pre-NAFTA regime, jobs
were not protected at all as capital had been migrating to Mexico at an
accelerating rate over the past twenty years. Domestically, therefore, while
the argument tapped into a deep reservoir of anger and anxiety, it failed to
engender a productive discussion about the quality and direction of working
life in the United States. At best it might have rallied enough energy to kill
the agreement in order to return to fight for a socially responsible trade
integration framework another day. But when activists turned around to
21. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, "This worker for a US company in Mexico
makes $4 per day," leaflet, n.d.
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reconstitute the fight in the event they had actually defeated the agreement,
they might have found their task all the more difficult as a provincial, even
nationalist, sentiment had already been marshaled against the transnational
economy. The domestic failings aside, internationally the argument clearly
was not designed for a Mexican audience. Any Latin American reading or
observing such arguments could readily conclude that "rich" norteameri-
canos had little concern outside of their own borders and that their approach
was fundamentally protectionist in nature. Indeed, it is painfully ironic that
the 42,221 jobs documented by the Department of Labor as being lost to
Mexico since the trade pact began is minuscule in comparison to the dev-
astation among small-scale agriculture and larger urban producers that have
lost hundreds of thousands of jobs south of the Rio Grande since the signing
of NAFTA.22
ni . The Singular Oppression of Mexican Workers
After the jobs loss approach, one of the largest and certainly most
seductive modes of argumentation used against the trade agreement was
based on the stereotype of the "oppressed Mexican worker." This tactic
frequently posed the maquiladora sector as the future of Mexican labor
relations should the trade agreement pass, while often ignoring the fact that
most of the export-processing jobs were created or moved there long before
the formal trade agreement was ever proposed (and would have undoubtedly
continued without it). Most importantly, this argument almost always ne-
glected the level of labor rights suppression taking place in the United
States, while emphasizing the horrible lack of rights in Mexico.
One extended example that captures much of this strategy comes from
an issue of the IBEW Journal which offers a "typical" description of labor
relations in the maquila zone:
A large company fires its entire work force, eliminates the union contract, then rehires
the workers at far-inferior wages. When the workers try to win the right to elect their
local union leaders and assert their right to legally mandated benefits, they suffer
kidnappings and beatings at the hands of the company and their union. Appeals to
legal authorities and to the official labor board offer no redress; these agencies, the
union and the company work together to suppress workers' legal rights and to in-
crease profits for each
Although the writer used this anecdote accurately to describe a scenario in
22. Wayne Cornelius, "NAFTA Costs Mexico More Job Losses Than the U.S." New
York Times, 17 October 1995.
23. "Corporations Profit From Labor-Rights Suppression in Mexico," IBEW Journal
(May 1993): 38-39.
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Mexico, numerous aspects of it could just as easily have been applied to a
variety of conflicts within the United States—including the Hormel strike in
Minnesota, a battle during the TDU struggle, the PATCO crisis, anyone of
a dozen textile mills in the US South, Frank Lorenzo's restructuring and
firing of union workers at Continental airlines or possibly even the tragic fire
at the Hamlet poultry plant in North Carolina. Instead of building a founda-
tion of mutual needs and shared problems between Mexican and US work-
ers, most of this discourse is not so much technically wrong, as much as it
creates a one-dimensional image of Mexican labor based on the smug—and
wrong—assumption that workers in the United States possess an unrestricted
right to organize and bargain collectively. On the level of praxis, the writ-
ings of labor intellectuals and academics fail if they seek international soli-
darity through heroics or condescension rather than a clear vision of the
complex needs of workers and labor movements in all countries—including
the United States— f^acing massive structural upheavals.^ "*
An article in the UAW Washington Report complicates this problem
even further. The "brutal" suppression of labor rights, the piece argues,
"gives Mexico and multinational companies operating in Mexico an unfair
competitive advantage."^^ For Mexican workers—or even liberals in the
United States that might weigh their sympathies more heavily in favor of
Mexican economic progress than in favor of US organized labor—this ap-
proach smacks of further pleas for protection of US unions' allegedly "nar-
row" interests rather than genuine concern for Mexican labor rights. Of
course labor's interests are not narrow as wages and working conditions
must be taken out of international competition if a reasonable social struc-
ture is to emerge out of the changing world order; the question is, however,
what are the appropriate political and rhetorical strategies for achieving this
goal? To portray Mexican labor as the black sheep of international workers'
movements, while the silent other that stands in judgment presumably pos-
sesses a movement that is universally respected, strong, and free of govem-
ment interference, will not lay the groundwork for a vision that can rise to
meet the immense difficulties of the task at hand. In essence, we must ask
why the US labor movement in one context—that of domestic politics—is
admittedly bullied and marginalized, but in another context—international
affairs— i^s it held up as the model of "free" trade unionism?
As two Mexican scholars, Moncayo and Delarbre, argue, labor in
24. See, for instance, David Barkin's critique of US labor intellectuals perspectives on
Mexican labor in his "A Constructive Strategy for Free Trade," Review of Radical Political
Economics 25(1993):135.
25. "Mexico Continues to Abuse Workers' Rights," UAW Washington Report 33(July
1993): 1; see also the UAW's "Ammo" pamphlet Not This NAFTA, 12, n.d.
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Mexico should have played a more active role in the NAFTA debate rather
than waffling from "acHtical hope to cathartic lack of confidence." Such
internal criticisms do not, however, allow US and Canadian unionists to
engage in blanket assaults on Mexican labor institutions. These two progres-
sive NAFTA advocates suggest that "North Americans" must avoid "an
authoritarian posture" toward Mexico which serves to undermine and criti-
cize their political and legal institutions "not on the basis of experience and
concrete evidence," they argue, "but on the basis of prejudices." Instead of
solidarity, these two authors conclude that US labor's efforts to portray
Mexican workers in the NAFTA campaign bordered on "a type of verbal
terrorism" with "little analytical basis."^^ The harshness with which these
scholars have rebuked the US response to NAFTA suggests very different
national concems about entering into the trade deal. Anthropologist Maria
Patricia Fernandez-Kelly aptly captured this tension by pointing out that
Ross Perot's "giant sucking sound to the south" had its counterpart in
Mexico—"the giant gulping sound to the north"—as Mexican's feared that
their economic, social, and cultural identity would be further absorbed into
the US economic colossus.^''
In reality, the decision by Mexican unions to back or fight the trade
agreement did depend upon their relationship to the state. As expected, the
official unions—whose approximately six million members constitute 80
percent of total union membership—aligned with the ruling PRI (Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party) and endorsed the agreement in the summer of
1991. These labor organizations were inheritors of power from the revolu-
tionary era when government brought labor into the state machinery as part
of a "social pact" in which alliance with the state created both the source of
organized labor's tremendous historical power and legitimacy while simul-
taneously defining the very real limits of its autonomy .^ ^ Given their close
ties to the ruling party and the considerably weakened position of labor
leaders after the austerity of the 1980s, Mexican labor's endorsement of the
trade deal came as no surprise. Although many in the US argued that the
labor organizations' acceptance of the pact proved Mexican labor's victim-
26. Pablo Pascual Moncayo and Raul Trejo Delarbre, Los Sindicatos Mexicanos Ante el
TLC (Mexico: Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion/Instituto Para Transicion
Democratica, 1993), 74-75.
27. M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, "Labor Force Recomposition and Industrial Restruc-
turing in Electronics: Implications for Free Trade," Hofstra Labor Law Journal 10(Spring
1993): 620.
28. Kevin J. Middlebrook, "State-Labor Relations in Mexico: The Changing Economic
and Political Context" in Middlebrook, ed.. Unions, Workers, and the State in Mexico (San
Diego: Center for US-Mexican Studies, 1991), 3-15; and Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revo-
lution: Labor, The State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995).
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ization by an authoritarian govemment, NAFTA had the support of 66 per-
cent of the Mexican people—although 52 percent felt that the US would
benefit more than Mexico from the deal.^ ^
In contrast to the Mexican supporters of NAFTA, the 12 percent of
union membership that opposed the govemment also opposed the trade
agreement.^" These unions emphasized not so much the rejection of the
agreement but the need for taking labor and other NGOs into the discus-
sions. Using the Canadian experience under the US-Canada trade agreement
as the harbinger for their future, the unionists pointed to the protectionism
of the United States, the impact on Canadian workers under their agreement
with the US, the closing of small and medium business which could not
compete with US goods, and the pressure on the social security system that
would result from the trade pact. Hundreds of representatives of various
NGOs and labor organizations eventually came together as the Red Mexi-
cana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC) to write the Zacatecas
agreement with substantial Canadian and some US labor participation. How-
ever, with the notable exception of energetic efforts by RMALC, as Enrique
de la Garza concludes, "labor mobilization regarding NAFTA was scant."^^
What opposition there was from official comers centered on the pres-
ervation of Mexico's sophisticated labor law and therefore the vast majority
of labor institutions in the country. As in Canada, downward harmonization
to US-style labor law remained a real and frightening possibility. As a union
representative stated to Mexican television after a meeting between the
Labor Congress and Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development
Jaime Serra Puche, "As a representative of the workers, we were very inter-
ested in preventing any sort of reforms to our laws, as far as possible, as we
consider them to the best in the world, and which other countries have
acknowledged."^^ Faced with withering influence within the govemment,
most Mexican unions dedicated their power and resources to defending their
institutions and contracts with a myopic blend of nationalism and faith in the
govemment. Fidel Velazquez, the nonagenarian leader of the CTM, argued
that labor "supported NAFTA unconditionally . . . because the federal gov-
emment will respect the rights of the workers" while he must have quietly
29. Enrique de la Garza Toledo, "Mexican Labor Unions Facing the Free Trade Agree-
ment" unpublished paper, Universidad Autonoma MetropoHtana, 9.
30. The remaining 8 percent are company-sponsored "white" unions which do not par-
ticipate in politics.
31. de la Garza, "Mexican Labor Unions," 19.
32. "NAFTA Not to Affect Mexican Labor Laws," Mexico City Canal 13 Television
1300 GMT, 20 August 1992 (FBIS-LAT-92-163).
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hoped that economic growth would liberate labor from the restrictions of the
Economic Stability and Growth pacts entered into during the economic cri-
sis. Finally, while Mexican dissidents took the lead toward a transnational
agenda, officialistas continued to balk at any sort of trinational labor plat-
form that might threaten to undermine what little domestic authority they
retained or might hope to regain.'^
As Maria Cook has summarized, the trend in Mexico has actually been
away from centralized labor institutions and toward a general pattern of
"deinstitutionalization." This process includes the weakening of national
bargaining institutions, such as the National Minimum Wage Commission;
the circumvention or possible elimination of national labor laws; and the
weakening of labor's strength and presence within the ruling party. By "dis-
rupting and altering the political and economic context in which trade unions
have traditionally operated," she suggests, "NAFTA may create new oppor-
tunities for trade union organization and activism in Mexico."^ "* Yet it is
often speculated that the govemmental support that remains for unions is a
product of labor's support for trade liberalization itself. Thus the politics of
labor and free trade in Mexico push toward forestalling legal and institu-
tional reforms that have historically guaranteed labor a place within the
authoritarian regime, yet that very system of govemance itself is simulta-
neously undergoing its most profound changes since the 1930s.
The tme failure of blaming other countries' labor movements for in-
sufficient labor-institutions can perhaps best be appreciated by observing the
fingers being pointed in the other direction. The largest official Mexican
federation, the CTM, rejected the fonnation of a supranational body to
monitor labor rights arguing that their laws are "superior and federally valid,
whereas in the neighboring country it is a conglomerate of local laws." To
bring Mexican law in harmony with the other two countries, suggested the
leadership of the CTM, "would be inexplicable because ours prescribes
better conditions for the workers."^^ While technically accurate, the CTM's
primary concem centered on national sovereignty and, like the AFL-CIO, its
own institutional survival, but it is nonetheless a poignant example of the
failings involved in seeking the moral high ground—as opposed to the com-
plex historical and political reality—when comparing labor movements in-
33. Moncayo and Delarbre, Los Sindicatos, 20-21.
34. Maria Lorena Cook, "Mexican State-Labor Relations and the Political Implications
of Free Trade," Latin American Perspectives 22(Winter 1995): 86.
35. Adrian Tejo, "CTM Rejects Formation of Cotmnission to Supervise Compliance
With Parallel Agreements," 3 June 1993 draft of an article for the Economist distributed in
mimeo by the AFL-CIO.
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temationally. Similarly, Canadians pointed to their experience under the
original Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in which the US South acted as
a cheap-labor haven for Canadian jobs—essentially making Dixie into a
rhetorical maquiladora zone for Canadian unionists.^* Clearly, when workers
in all countries face parallel struggles, any position that explicitly or implic-
itly stakes out the US labor movement as a norm or seeks to single out other
countries' weaknesses will fail to foster transnational dialogue as wager
earners are increasingly squeezed into the same labor market.
IV. Cross-Border Solidarity
Despite the material, ideological, and political barriers that separate
Mexican and US labor movements, cross-border links provided some of the
most rewarding and enlightening moments in the struggle against both
NAFTA and the broader trend of North-South trade integration. Examples of
cross-border visits, rallies, seminars, conferences, information exchanges,
and even organizing efforts were increasingly evident throughout all sectors
of the labor movement during the anti-NAFTA campaign. At worst, labor
transnationalism only confirmed US labor's preconceptions of Mexican
workers and their conditions—situations that visitors knew would just get
worse under NAFTA. At best, however, cross-border solidarity opened up
tremendous political and social opportunities for labor in the global
economy. Many agree that these efforts and the coalitions of labor, human
rights, and environmental groups accompanying them are blazing the way
for the future of social change in North America.^ ^
For example, Raul Marquez, the Mexican leader of the dissident Au-
thentic Workers Front (Frente Autentico de los Trabajadores or FAT), told
a Teamster rally, "We don't want to be used as intemational scabs. We want
to work with you to win good jobs for everyone . . . They don't want to raise
our wages in Mexico. They want to lower yours."^* Similarly, the small but
36. Jim Stanford, in Canada Under Free Trade (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1993), 153; see
also Bruce Campbell, "Restructuring the Economy: Canada into the Free Trade Era," in The
Political Economy of North American Free Trade, Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron,
eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 98-99.
37. For a critical but supportive reflection on coalitions and NAFTA, see Rand Wilson,
Massachusetts Director of Jobs with Justice, "Winning Lessons from the NAFTA Loss,"
Lahor Research Review 22(1994): 29-37; see also the variety of experiences in Jeremy Brecher
and Tim Costello, eds.. Building Bridges: the Emerging Grassroots Coalition of Labor and
Community (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993).
38. "Mexican Labor Leader Joins Teamster Caravan," The New Teamster (December
1992): 6.
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creatively militant United Electrical Workers (UE) responded to the erosion
of its members' jobs by launching an "adopt an organizer" program with
their sister union, the FAT. This program offers assistance in organizing
plants on the Mexican side while the UB continued to pursue plants in the
US. In another case, when the Green Giant plant moved from Watsonville
to Irapuato, the Teamsters uncovered where they moved the plant and forged
links with their Mexican counterparts. The results of the campaign were
extended training benefits for the displaced Watsonville workers and an
agreement with Green Giant to build a waste treatment plant to take care of
the polluted water in Irapuato. Such alliances have their parallels in the Farm
Labor Organizing Committee's (FLOC) transnational project to help orga-
nize Campbell's farm workers, the United Auto Workers Local 879's dra-
matic building of the MEXUSCAN trinational coalition in solidarity with
the struggle of Mexican workers at Ford-Cuatitilan, and the cross-border
organizing seminars sponsored by Labor Notes. The majority of these acts
of intemational solidarity rose out of the independent and dissident labor
unions in the US and Mexico but could conceivably develop adequate
momentum to break through from the periphery to the mainstream of the
labor movements on both sides of the border.^'
Obstacles to official connections between the Mexican, US and Cana-
dian federations, however, remain large. Despite official ties of some histori-
cal depth, the AFL-CIO has not had success in moving toward a common
alliance with the CTM. The maquiladora sector, the most important area to
US unionists, has remained a point of fmstrating contention between the two
national labor federations since the CTM, in partnership with the official
state party, the PRI, has generally sought the growth of the maquiladora
program. Expansion of the export processing sector serves both the Mexican
labor federation's own institutional strength and the Mexican economy, but
such growth is often carried out through highly repressive tactics in an
attempt to maintain industrial peace and foster the program's growth. As
Harry Browne and Beth Simms have argued, however.
There is not tiecessarily a contradiction between [CTM leader Fidel] VelSzquez'
commitments to organize the maquiladoras and to promote the industry. The
maquiladora program competes directly with loW-wage export-processing zones around
39. Kim Moody and Mary McGinn, Unions and Free Trade (Detroit: Labor Notes,
1992); Tom Laney, "Step-by-Step" mimeo describing MBXUSCAN efforts in Labor Note's
"Free Trade Organizer's Packet" (Detroit: Labor Notes, n.d.); for a sober analysis of these
efforts see Barry Carr, "Labor Internationalism in the Era of NAFTA: Past and Present," Latin
American Studies Occasional Papers #14 (Miami: Center for Labor Research and Studies,
Florida International University, 1995).
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the globe, and one of the principal arenas of competition is the stability of the work
force. Attracting investors means controlling worker activism, and the most direct
way the CTM and other official unions can do that is to organize workers under their
own banners. Accounts abound of the efficiency with which official unions perform
this function.'"
Whether the CTM organizes maquila workers into democratic unions or not,
the choice for the AFL-CIO has been between working slowly toward some
sort of arrangement with the state-oriented CTM or embracing the small, and
relatively weak, independent movements in Mexico. After being obedient
foot soldiers in the Cold War, US unions are chary to engage in the left-wing
politics of the non-official unions in Mexico. In addition, the AFL-CIO has
its own power base to consider. As one observer noted, "As soon as you start
dealing with non-official labor unions in other countries, you open it up to
their dealing with non-official bodies in this country."^^
While attempts to forge official linkages still remain rare, a more
common type of cross-border solidarity is a series of maquiladora tours
organized locally throughout the country on the part of US workers, and less
frequently, tours of the US by Mexican workers. The results are usually
emotional revelations about US workers' privileged status in the global
economy, as well as a renewed faith in both international solidarity and the
humanity of Mexican workers. When a Tennessee delegation from ACTWU
went down to meet their counterparts and to see where many of their jobs
had migrated, the response was revulsion at "the shacks, sitting in muddy
water. No sewers. Trash." On another trip, a Steelworker from Milwaukee
responded similarly to the squalor of the maquila zone, "I was heartsick,"
she exclaimed, "It was nothing I ever anticipated." A response to
maquiladora tours echoed throughout the literature on the subject was to try
to kill the agreement because, as another steelworker said, "It would expand
the situation of the maquiladoras to all parts of Mexico.'"*^ Yet the border
area, while grossly underregulated and an environmentally-troubled zone,
boasts the highest employment rates in the country.
Although the dominant response is often disgust at living conditions in
the border zone and a glimpse of the post-NAFTA future, some visiting
workers came away with a more subtle perspective on labor international-
ism. "Like human beings, they want to make a decent wage where they can
40. Harry Brown and Beth Sims, "Global Capitalism, Global Unionism," The Resource
Center Bulletin (Winter 1993).
41. Quote is from an "academic observer" quoted in Browne and Sims, "Global Capi-
talism."
42. "Unionists See NAFTA's Danger," Steelabor 58(May/June 1993): 10-11.
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have a decent living," recalled a shop steward from Tennessee, "I think they
are proud to have jobs. And I think they kind of fear, too, that we have the
attitude that they're taking our jobs away. And I guess most Americans do!
I'd say the majority of them, to be honest. The Mexican workers have that
to fear. But all in all, I think they'd like to unite and be a coalition, and do
something about the standards.'"*^ After touring and studying labor condi-
tions in Ciudad Juarez, a labor-newspaper editor went so far as to reverse the
"oppressed Mexican worker" argument by suggesting that US workers had
much to leam from their counterparts in Mexico. "After seeing how they
persevere in the face of far more difficult obstacles than we face, and after
seeing some of the creative solutions to organizing problems they have come
up with," she reflected after her trip, "I think [Mexican workers] can teach
us a lot that will be useful in reinvigorating the labor movement and orga-
nizing the unorganized in this country."**
One successful transnational response by the AFL-CIO that involves
corporate campaign tactics, links with other social movements, and cross-
border solidarity has been its involvement with the Coalition for Justice in
the Maquiladoras (CJM). Pushing corporate campaigns against the worst
violators of labor and environmental standards, publicizing problems with
toxic chemicals, bringing political and media figures into the border zone,
supporting worker-to-worker actions, and writing and publicizing the CJM
"Code of Conduct for the Maquiladoras" are only some of the Coalition's
concems and actions. The Code of Conduct has served as an organizational
point for minimum standards for both local or transnational corporations
operating in any of the three countries. The CJM is able to circumvent
possible antagonisms between the CTM and the AFL-CIO by linking up
loosely with various organizations rather than making official ties with
groups that may be in opposition to the official Mexican federation.
Intemational solidarity in all forms is certainly one of the most impres-
sive and exciting approaches to the challenges of free trade. It consciously
stmggles to overcome US labor's privileged past, it brings the reality of a
certain level of shared common identity to workers intemationally, and it
builds the groundwork to do for labor what capital has already successfully
done: gone global. It is not, however, without problems. "Why, all of a
43. Interview with shop steward Luvemel Clark from Knoxville in David Brooks, "Search
for Counterparts: A Labor-Community Agenda Must Cross Borders as Well," Labor Research
Review 19(1992): 91-93.
44. Comments of Barb Kucera of the St. Paul, MN Union Advocate quoted in the Min-
neapolis-based Resource Center of the Americas' Labor Report on the Americas 4(January-
February 1994): 2.
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sudden are you calling us 'brothers'?" asked one Mexican trade union leader
of his US audience, "Is it because today you realize you need us, because
you are about to lose your jobs—perhaps even your unions—and because we
stand to gain from your loss? Where have you been for the past 40 years
when many times we were in need of you?"^^
Clearly only a small percentage of workers will ever have the oppor-
tunity to come into immediate contact with their "other" while the rest must
depend upon accounts of such activities in the labor press. The most ambi-
tious campaign for cross-border solidarity therefore must be, at best, a partial
solution. Indeed, as historians such as Barry Carr and Harvey Levenstein
remind us, labor internationalism has a deep history that makes plain, on the
one hand, the rich rewards of cross-border connections, and, on the other
hand, the countless difficulties for meaningful exchange, and the ease with
which such linkages can devolve into perfunctory officialdom or be easily
manipulated by the dominant power. As Levenstein wrote in 1971, connec-
tions between US and Mexican labor organizations were historically "either
accepted as a given, and therefore not even mentioned, or relegated to the
realm of platitudinous oratory. This is understandable, for the ideal itself,
separated from specific interests, becomes almost inoperative.""*^
V. International Labor Rights
Least used ofthe four discursive themes uncovered in labor's response
to NAFTA is the call for international labor standards which would elevate
regulatory mechanisms to the same transnational plane inhabited by capital.
Supranational rights and standards, or more lofty goals such as a continental
social charter, were often discussed as something that was needed in the
abstract in labor's anti-NAFTA struggles, but frighteningly little mobiliza-
tion ever emerged around the issue and few alternatives to the form and
content of the North American Free Trade Agreement surfaced. What is
intriguing about an active approach to placing labor rights at the core of the
debate is its unique characteristic of having potential appeal to workers in
all countries. All workers, in theory, would like minimum working condi-
tions, adequate wages, a safe and healthy working environment, and guar-
antees of fundamental labor law such as the rights to strike and bargain
45. Brooks, "Search for Counterparts," 83.
46. Emphasis added. Harvey Levenstein, Labor Organizations in the United States and
Mexico: A History of Their Relations (Westport: Greenwood, 1971), 5; Barry Carr, "Labor
Internationalism."
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collectively; it is one of the few points of possible commonality between
national labor movements forced to compete for the same jobs.
Throughout the 1980s, the US Congress made eligibility for the exten-
sion of trade benefits contingent upon other countries' compliance with
basic labor laws—including the rights to organize and to bargain collec-
tively. When Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton announced his support for
NAFTA in October of 1992, he did so contingent upon the negotiation of
labor and environmental side accords that included "easy access to the
courts, public hearings, the right to present evidence, streamlined procedures
and effective remedies" to violations, indicating that the linkage between
labor rights and trade liberalization would continue."*' In early 1993, the
AFL-CIO and its allies renewed its historically unsuccessful commitment to
the Intemational Labour Organization's (ILO) conventions—especially
numbers 87 and 98 covering the freedom of association, protection of the
right to organize, and the right to bargain collectively—and recommended
them as a framework for negotiating the side accords advocated by the new
President.''^ With little mobilization around the idea of intemational labor
rights, the resulting labor side accord to NAFTA failed to cover the essen-
tials of labor law, and the aspects of work which were covered lacked
meaningful enforcement mechanisms."*^
Another model organized labor frequently suggested for labor rights
was the set of sophisticated and stringent safeguards already in the pact for
the protection of intellectual property rights. While the agreement lacks
provisions guaranteeing freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively which supporters of the deal regarded as an infringement on
national sovereignty, the pact's intellectual property rights require that nego-
47. Bill Clinton, "Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs," mimeo of speech
given at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, 4 October 1992, Little Rock: National
Campaign Headquarters, 14.
48. The AFL-CIO and the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund both
pushed for Conventions 87 and 98, plus Conventions 105 (forced labor), 155 and 170 (occu-
pational health and safety), 138 (child labor), 100 and 111 (equal remuneration and nondis-
crimination); the AFL-CIO also called for limitations on hours of work (ILO Recommendation
116), and Minimum Wages, (ILO Conventions 95 and 131). See AFL-CIO Discussion Paper,
"Labor Rights and Standards and NAFTA" (Washington: AFL-CIO, February 1993); and
Pharis Harvey, "Protecting Labor Rights in Connection with North American Free Trade"
mimeo based on legislative testimony before the House of Representatives (Washington:
ILRERF, March 1993); see also Richard Rothstein, "Setting the Standard: International Labor
Rights and US Trade Policy," Briefing Paper of the Economic Policy Institute (Washington:
EPI, March 1993).
49. Jefferson Cowie and John D. French, "NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: A Textual
Analysis," a special puUout section of Latin American News 9(1994).
NATIONAL STRUGGLES IN A TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY 25
tiated standards become part of each country's domestic law, that any inter-
ested party can pursue complaints of violations, and that any goods in vio-
lation of the agreement can be stopped right at the border if manufactured
in violation of the rules. As then AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Thomas R.
Donahue eloquently argued, negotiators set up a dual track in the agreement
that protects one form of labor but not another. When supporters of the
agreement bring out the national sovereignty argument, he suggested,
"please ask them to explain why invention, a labor of the mind, should be
considered more sacrosanct than the labor accomplished by the sweat of the
Despite expressions of interest and even urgent pleas for intemational
labor standards, there was precious little dialogue with the rank and file over
the issue and few points of mobilization. For instance, an article in the AFL-
CIO News entitled, "Labor Insists Worker Rights Key to World Economy,"
described meetings between labor leaders, the IMF, and the World Bank.
"We define ourselves as internationalists," explained Secretary-Treasurer
Thomas R. Donahue, "We believe that the destiny of workers in Pittsburgh
and Los Angeles is linked to the workers in Mexico City and Toronto and
Buenos Aires, and indeed to those in Prague and Lusaka as well."^^ Yet the
distance between such lofty rhetoric and political mobilization remained
great as the labor leader directed his message at the Bretton Woods elite
rather than the rank and file. While intemational standards are beginning to
drift into the discourse of the labor intelligentsia, there have been no broad-
based appeals for labor standards, little attempt to inform workers about
supra-national agencies, and not surprisingly, no protest signs demanding
intemational rights and standards.
Although many US labor activists attended the Zacatecas meeting in
Mexico where important and ambitious altematives to NAFTA were
sketched out, there was almost nothing advanced in the United States that
could be readily recognized as a socially-responsible altemative framework
for North American trade integration.'^ One of the reasons for this failure is
50. Statement of Thomas R. Donahue before the Senate Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation Committee on the North American Free Trade Agreement, 6 May 1993, AFL-CIO
mimeo, 4-5.
51. AFL-CIO News, 7 December 1992.
52. The closest possibility was when many NGO leaders and unionist came together as
the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART formerly MODTLE) in Washington to write the "US
Citizen's Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement" in December of 1992 which,
although not an altemative framework for integration, offered a detailed criticism of the trade
pact that pointed toward many useful suggestions for improving the pact. Also see the Labor
Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy on the North American Free
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that problems with intemational labor standards still remain numerous. They
tend to leave matters in the hands of experts and bureaucrats, they are typi-
cally a distant abstraction to the rank and file, and most of all, reliable
enforcement mechanisms for intemational laws and regulations remain elu-
sive.^ ^ At this point, however, compliance issues are less complicated than
the CTM's opposition to them, general foot dragging by the AH^CIO,
historical resistance by the US govemment to standards such as those pro-
posed by the Intemational Labour Organization, and the portrayal of trade
integration as a yes-or-no proposition rather than an open-ended project.^ '*
Had the political discussion surrounding NAFTA been centered on altema-
tives rather than deepening the yes-or-no decision locked in place by the
Fast Track process, perhaps the Labor Side Accord might have been a more
usable document.
Most problematic, the linkage of labor rights and trade—^particularly in
the politically charged North-South context—is always open to accusations
of protectionism and coercion. Labor activists in developing countries trying
to attract jobs and development can, to First World ears, sound like the same
multinational investors or pro-free trade politicians that they are trying to
defeat. But from the Southem perspective, the relocation of regulations from
the state to an intemational body would leave less-developed countries vul-
nerable to unilateral action from powerful actors like the US who wish to
check the use of less-expensive labor. Unemployment and the erosion of
labor standards in the United States is a product of countless economic and
political pressures that go far beyond the relocation of production to other
countries, these Third World critics contend, and should not be blamed on
workers in the developing world. In this regard, a complaint working its way
through the NAFTA Side Accord mechanisms from the Mexican communi-
cation workers against labor practices by Sprint in the United States is very
Trade Agreement, "Preliminary Report" 16 September 1992 which, after a perfunctory gloss
on labor rights, essentially sought to mold the entire agreement toward interests of US workers
and to the exclusion of Mexican and Canadian workers.
53. See for instance, the critique of the European model in Manfred McDowell, "NAFTA
and the EC 'Social Dimension,"' Labor Studies Journal 20(Spring 1995): 31^7; for an
elaboration of the possibilities and obstacles surrounding a shared transnational agenda for the
three national trade union federations see Scott Littlehale, "Creating a Social Dimension to
North American Integration: the Trinational Politics of Social Clauses" unpublished paper
presented at the IX Southem Labor Studies Conference, University of Texas at Austin, 26-29
October 1995.
54. CTM President Fidel Velazquez has proclaimed, "We won't accept any organization
that is not national, not even the International Labour Organization. We agree in terms of the
environment, because they [the US] are further along than us, but in the area of labor, here
we have many means for recourse." El Financiero, 25 May 1993.
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encouraging in that it serves to reverse the traditional power relationship by
having the developing country spotlight abuses in the developed nation.
Clearly, globally mobile capital requires some sort of similarly global regu-
latory system but it must be constructed in concert with activists and con-
cems from underdeveloped countries.^^
V. Conclusions for the Post-NAFTA Era
Reviewing the four components of the NAFTA fight suggests both
cause for celebration and pause for reflection. While capital has long crossed
borders with relative ease, the obstacles that block organized labor's path
toward a similar transnational agenda have always been large, complicated
and difficult to traverse. In facing the challenges, however, the labor move-
ments in the United States and Canada went from retreat in the face of
neoliberalism to near victory in the struggle against the trade pacts. Workers
in all three countries experimented with new forms of coalition building,
developed new political strategies and tactics, and most importantly, gained
an awareness of the economic connections they had with other nation's
workers. The dominant theme of each country's response to NAFTA, how-
ever, remained well behind transnational capital as it was limited largely to
the socio-cultural and geopolitical boundaries of the nation state.
Tuming a critical eye to labor in the United States, the political project
against free trade failed not only to defeat the agreement (although it did
come very close), but most importantly, it never generated sophisticated
altematives—or much in the way of political space to consider altema-
tives—to the economic and political process that was bent on integrating
capital but not people.^^ The two major arguments marshaled against
NAFTA—job losses and the lack of Mexican labor rights—proved to be a
nationalistic diversion from constmcting meaningful altematives to the trade
deal and often perpetuated chauvinistic notions about US workers' economic
security and the level of labor rights enjoyed in the United States. Making
the deepening fear over job losses into the overarching metaphor for
globalization simply did not foster any altemative positions to global re-
structuring nor formulate specific ideas about what workers actually might
favor. These two tactics also failed in the transnational arena where they
55. Lance Compa, " . . . And the Twain Shall Meet? A North-South Controversy Over
Labor Rights and Trade," Labor Research Review 23(1995): 51-65; and Jon Pattee, "Sprint
and the Shutdown of La Conexion Familiar," Labor Research Review 23(1995): 13-21.
56. See the similar efforts and conclusions in Wilson, "Winning Lessons," 35-37.
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exacted a future price in terms of relations with Mexican workers as they
tended to tum them into competitors rather than compadres in a common
struggle. The other two discursive modes an a^lyzed here, cross border soli-
darity and international labor rights, have been much more limited in their
scope (so as to be invisible and inaudible to many workers) but nonetheless,
if carefully done, suggest productive strategies for defusing the tensions
fostered by global capital.
Events since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, however, suggest that strategies with a more continent-wide appeal
than those wielded during the NAFTA fight may be in the making. If
Stephen Diamond was right that "the fundamental goal of many of [labor's
strategies] during the NAFTA negotiations was to weigh down the discus-
sion in order to stop the agreement from going forward—^not to recognize
the global and strategic context in which the free trade debate has inevitably
emerged" then the end of that fight may provide for a more creative political
space.^' Indeed, there is mounting evidence that with the struggle to defeat
the pact out of the way, important elements within the mainstream of the US
labor movement have begun to tum to the issue of much greater urgency
than the NAFTA vote itself: how to contend with the reality of a continental
labor market which has been under silent construction for decades. The three
post-NAFTA tactics briefly outlined below, while perhaps still quite frag-
mented and incipient, may be paving the way for the future of North Ameri-
can labor and, taken as an aggregate response, suggest grounds for hope for
the future of national labor organizations caught in a transnational dilemma.
Reestablish Domestic Strength
Since globalization alone cannot be blamed for labor's weakness
within national politics, few developments could be more important than the
recent ferment at the national offices of the AFL-CIO.^ ^ Following the elec-
tion of John Sweeney to the presidenpy of the federation, many projects have
been launched, and the labor movement has gained a larger place in the
national spotlight. The 1996 "Union Summer" project introduced many
college students to the labor movement, highlighted the need for an increase
in the ethnic diversity of its organizers, and even injected a dose of youthful
57. Diamond, "US Labor," 257.
58. Parallel changes may be emerging in Mexico. Forty unions defied the ban imposed
by Fidel Veldzquez against marching on May Day 1996, including 21 unions of the official
Labor Congress which participated despite threat of expulsion. The massive protest was led
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idealism into union organizing. In addition, the successful minimum wage
campaign demonstrated that labor's interests are not as parochial as critics
like to believe and helped revitalize its role in national politics since the
defeat of health care reform. Behind the scenes, changes in the AFL-CIO's
intemational office—^particularly the resignation of William Doherty, the
thirty-year executive director of AIFLD—hopefully indicates a more pro-
gressive foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere and the end of some
of the more unconscionable acts which have historically emerged from that
department. John Sweeney has even suggested that unions need "to move
toward coordinated bargaining involving workers in this country and those
in other countries" who wdfk for the same corporation, although the amount
of resources to be placed behind such an ambitious agenda remains to be
seen.
Although this paper has argued for increased resources and organizing
on the transnational level, the nation state will continue to be the focal point
for redress of labor grievances for a very, very long time to come. A re-
newed national presence will therefore be of utmost importance. As
Benedict Anderson has argued, the nation forms an "imagined community,"
and the domestic fight cannot be forfeited for some lofty brand of
transnationalism that overlooks national politics for solutions.^^ As Sam
Ginden, Research Director of the Canadian Autoworkers, furthers the argu-
ment, "the nation-state is absolutely fundamental as a place where people
can democratically try to do things, that it isn't so distant that it becomes
something that you can't control or so localized that it isn't really
practical if you really were strong at the nation-state, you actually could
talk about why don't we have intemational standards or why aren't we
dealing with intemational capital flows which are in fact increasingly desta-
bilizing."«o
Exercise and Strengthen Transnational institutions
On the transnational plane of action, there is further encouragement
that NAFTA's Labor Side Accord, rather than the mere palliative for which
it has been dismissed, could be made into a useful tool for prying open
meaningful intemational labor standards that could serve to discourage low-
wage corporate strategies. Four cases have already been pushed through the
59. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).
60. Interview with Sam Ginden, Research Director of the Canadian Auto Workers, by
John French of Duke University on 22 June 1994 in Toronto.
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Labor Side Accord mechanisms by both Mexican and US organizations
which allege failures to enforce rights or standards in the other country.
Although each of these complaints have only produced the "penalty" of
more meetings and further discussions as critics predicted, they have brought
important public attention to key labor rights issues.
Furthermore, as Stephen Herzenberg has argued, the exercising of the
flabby muscles of the side agreement could be orchestrated toward a single
end: rebuilding the agreement.^^ The side accord specifically allows for a
review of its effectiveness within four years. With adequate pressure and
evidence accumulated through the limited mechanisms offered within the
agreement, the end result could be the opportunity to place genuine labor
rights on the trinational bargaining table. The much-criticized Evaluation
Committees of Experts (ECE) at the core of the Side Accord's provisions,
although blocked from handling industrial relations issues, could be made
into a forum for pursuing more meaningful trinational standards. The idea
would be to build adequate bureaucratic momentum and self interest on
behalf of national representatives to NAFTA's labor institutions to insure its
growth and eventual restmcturing.
The recent crackdown on Los Angeles garment sweatshops offers
Mexican activists a wonderful opportunity to request an ECE investigation
against the US and further reverse the anti-NAFTA logic that Mexico is the
singular labor standards violator. In fact, there are grounds for each country
launching ECEs against the garment sector in each of the other countries
which could illuminate the need for effective transnational regulation of this
uniquely exploitative sector. Herzenberg similarly suggests the viability of
such trinational squeezes on agricultural labor practices, janitorial services,
and a variety of other sectors. Other ideas include aggressively pursing the
Cooperative Programs called for in the side agreement which could even
include regional development strategies, a commission on 21st century labor
rights, and transnational wage and productivity monitoring. The side accord
mechanisms are not the only arena for an increased transnational presence
as the North American Development Bank and the Border Environmental
Co-operative Commission are other continental institutions which organized
labor could help push toward a greater role in transnational regulation and
development.
61. For a discussion of these options see Stephen Herzenberg, "Switching Tracks: Using
NAFTA's Labor Agreement to Move Toward the High Road," Border Briefing #2, Interhemi-
sphedc Resource Center/International Labor Rights Fund.
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Organize Reflectively
Finally, a more reflective posture can be seen in the way US unions are
thinking and acting with regard to their southem neighbors. These ap-
proaches avoid the sticky problems of first world protectionism, publicly
highlight corporate responsibility, and are cautious and constmctive about
the message labor organizations are sending to other countries. Three ex-
amples will illustrate this trend. The Teamsters Union won an important
victory to delay the opening of the US border-states to lower-standard and
less-safe Mexican trucks. But their efforts did not end there. This action was
followed by the trinational NAFTA Truckers' Summit to discuss shared
sectoral issues, and a full-page advertisement in Mexico City's largest inde-
pendent daily paper. La Jornada, calling for coordinated efforts by working
families in all three countries. The advertisement also made clear to Mexican
readers that the union did not support the well-publicized scapegoating of
immigrants in the United States—a simple act which helps to undermine
stereotypes Mexicans have of a blatantly racist US working-class. "Our fight
is not with each other," concluded Teamster President Ron Carey, "Our fight
is against corporate greed that is destroying jobs and wages on both sides of
the border."
Another constmctive effort, albeit not with a NAFTA country, which
gracefully avoided the pitfalls of first-world protectionism, has emerged
from the campaign against the popular clothing retailer. The GAP. Coordi-
nated by the National Labor Committee with help from UNITE (Union of
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees), the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility and a host of local organizations, the campaign
featured a US tour by teenage maquila workers from El Salvador which
targeted the GAP's retail businesses. The firing of 350 workers in the face
of an organizing effort at one of GAP's subcontracted facilities initiated the
campaign and resulted in two very significant victories: the first time any
retailer has agreed to submit to third-party monitoring of its factories, and
an agreement to remove its production from the factory unless the workers
were reinstated in their positions and negotiations were begun with the fired
unionists to resolve their differences. Such actions are a key step toward
making both consumers and corporations accountable for their actions. Most
importantly, by targeting the company and demanding that the employees be
retumed to their jobs, this strategy sidesteps the traditional approach of trade
sanctions which have been criticized as protectionist measures wielded for
the benefit of US workers against foreign workers.
The third and final example of organizing refiectively suggests the
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power of perseverance and intemational solidarity. When female workers at
EMOSA, a Tijuana o-ring factory owned by a California-based company,
were forced to parade around in a bikini contest for the amusement of the
company's president, the workers filed complaints with Mexican authorities.
The company failed to appear at the subsequent hearing and simply closed
the plant without paying the workers the severance pay required by Mexican
law. With assistance from the Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers
in San Diego, the workers filed suit in Los Angeles—the first time Mexican
workers have sued a transnational company in US courts for violations of
Mexican labor law. The success of the case, however, hinged on actions
from the UAW's Intemational Labor Solidarity Network in distant Michi-
gan. The UAW's agreement with the Big Three auto firms includes the
stipulation that suppliers must be "good corporate citizens" and, under pres-
sure of losing contracts with the automakers, the company agreed to settle
out of court. Although terms of the agreement are secret, the women are
reported to be happy with their financial settlement and are making plans to
launch a manufacturing co-operative.
These examples suggest that labor's formula for forging ahead in the
post-NAFTA era is emerging from the disparate struggles against concrete
circumstances across the continent. The rebuilding of domestic power, work-
ing toward more effective transnational labor institutions, and organizing on
a more reflective and strategic basis suggest that the high road toward con-
tinental integration may already be under construction. These three ap-
proaches each serve to shift the focus away from the zero-sum logic of job
losses and avoid singling out the victimization of Mexican workers; instead
they serve to confront the reality of an already-existing pattern of
transnational economic integration. In retrospect, perhaps the NAFTA fight
itself may have been a diversion which prevented the labor movement from
contending with the core of the crisis. Just saying "no" to a trade proposal
was much easier than confronting the fundamental labor problem of the 21st
century—the globalization of the labor market. With the NAFTA stmggle
now history, planning for the future appears to be already underway.

